Nuclear Expansion Needs $6 Trillion: What the New Global Investment Roadmap Means for Africa

The global nuclear-energy debate is entering a decisive phase. The question is no longer simply whether nuclear power will contribute to the world’s future energy mix. Increasingly, the question is whether governments, industries and financial institutions can mobilise the capital required to translate nuclear ambitions into operating facilities.

The World Nuclear Association’s newly released Roadmap to Mainstream Finance: The Path to Scale Nuclear Energy estimates that the global nuclear sector could require approximately US$6 trillion in cumulative investment by 2050. Annual investment would need to rise to around US$250 billion, roughly three times the recent level, if global capacity is to expand at the scale now envisaged by governments and industry. The estimate covers the full nuclear value chain—from uranium mining and fuel production to reactor construction, operation, waste management, decommissioning and storage.

This is not a forecast that every announced reactor will be completed. The World Nuclear Association itself recognises that many national targets remain aspirational and are not yet supported by identified projects, firm financing or final investment decisions. Nevertheless, the figure illustrates the scale of the financial architecture that would be required to turn the present nuclear revival into sustained deployment.

For Africa, the US$6 trillion estimate should not be treated as a distant global statistic. It should be understood as a warning.

African countries will not participate meaningfully in the next era of nuclear energy merely by signing cooperation agreements, announcing preferred technologies or inviting reactor vendors to submit proposals. Nuclear deployment requires a complete financing system that begins years before construction and continues long after a plant stops generating electricity.

The real challenge is not simply finding enough money to purchase a reactor. It is financing the institutions, infrastructure and long-term obligations required to own, regulate, operate, secure, fuel and eventually decommission that reactor responsibly.

Nuclear financing begins before construction

Public discussions frequently reduce nuclear investment to the cost of the power plant itself. That is misleading.

Before the first concrete is poured, a nuclear-newcomer country must finance:

These activities may require substantial expenditure over several years, yet they produce no immediate electricity revenue. At this stage, there is no completed plant, no long-term operating record and no guaranteed power-purchase income against which conventional lenders can safely provide finance.

This creates what I consider to be the first major financing gap confronting African nuclear-newcomer programmes: project-preparation finance.

Reactor vendors may be willing to support feasibility studies, technology assessments and site work. Their participation can be valuable. But a country should not depend principally on a prospective supplier to determine whether that supplier’s own technology is technically suitable, economically justified or financially affordable.

The host country must retain the capacity to commission and independently validate the studies on which its decisions will be based.

Africa needs nuclear project-preparation facilities

In my view, African countries seriously considering nuclear power should establish dedicated nuclear project-preparation facilities before entering final reactor negotiations.

These facilities should provide ring-fenced, multiyear financing for the work required to move a programme from political ambition to an evidence-based investment decision.

A credible project-preparation facility should support:

1. detailed site and environmental studies;
2. grid-stability and transmission assessments;
3. independent reactor-technology comparisons;
4. financial-readiness and affordability modelling;
5. legal, liability and contractual advisory services;
6. regulatory capacity and independent technical support;
7. owner-operator development;
8. workforce and supply-chain strategies;
9. fuel-cycle and radioactive-waste planning; and
10. structured public and host-community engagement.

Funding should be released against measurable milestones and subjected to strong procurement, audit and conflict-of-interest controls.

The objective must not be to commission endless consultancy reports. It must be to produce reliable data, credible institutions and defensible decisions.

A well-designed project-preparation process must also be capable of concluding that a proposed project is premature, too large, poorly structured or financially unsustainable.

That should not be considered failure. Avoiding an unsuitable multibillion-dollar investment may be one of the most valuable outcomes of responsible nuclear planning.

Ghana illustrates the financial-readiness challenge

Ghana provides one of the clearest African examples of why technical and institutional readiness must be matched by financial readiness.

The country has officially progressed into Phase Two of the IAEA Milestones Approach. Nuclear Power Ghana was established in 2018 as the prospective owner-operator and registered as a limited-liability company in 2019. Ghana has also developed an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority and accumulated decades of experience in nuclear research, radiation protection, safeguards, security and human-resource development.

Ghana has identified Nsuban in the Western Region as the preferred site for its first nuclear power plant, with Obotan in the Central Region as the alternative. In February 2025, an IAEA Site and External Events Design review examined the country’s site-selection process and provided recommendations for strengthening the underlying studies and management arrangements. Published programme information continues to refer to an intended plant of approximately 1,000 MWe, potentially entering operation around 2034.

These are meaningful achievements. Ghana’s programme is no longer merely an abstract ambition discussed during periods of electricity shortage.

But institutional progress should not be confused with project bankability.

The most demanding and expensive preparatory activities still lie ahead. Ghana must finance detailed site characterisation, environmental and social studies, grid integration, regulatory review, technology selection, owner-operator development, security, safeguards, emergency preparedness, workforce expansion and public engagement before a credible final investment decision can be reached.

The programme has therefore entered a stage where financial readiness may become as decisive as technical readiness.

Ghana’s existing energy-sector finances cannot be ignored

Ghana is not beginning its nuclear programme from a financially neutral position.

The 2026 Budget allocated GH¢15.2 billion for energy-sector shortfall payments and another GH¢4.8 billion for legacy independent-power-producer debt. The same budget reported that the sector had carried approximately US$1.4 billion in debt to independent power producers and required continuing restructuring and payment reforms.

The Ministry of Finance separately reported that approximately US$1.47 billion was paid during 2025 to clear energy-sector debt and restore payment arrangements. The IMF has repeatedly warned that energy-sector arrears, distribution losses, payment weaknesses and the financial performance of state-owned enterprises remain major fiscal risks for Ghana.

This raises a fundamental nuclear-financing question:

Who will credibly purchase and pay for the electricity from Ghana’s first nuclear power plant for several decades?

A long-term power-purchase agreement does not become bankable merely because it has been signed by a public utility. Lenders will examine whether the off-taker can meet its obligations consistently throughout the repayment period.

Where the electricity purchaser lacks sufficient creditworthiness, investors may demand:

These guarantees can create substantial public liabilities, even where the project loan does not immediately appear as ordinary government debt.

Ghana must therefore avoid resolving the reactor developer’s financing problem by transferring unlimited risk to taxpayers and electricity consumers.

Nuclear power cannot be separated from electricity-sector reform

Ghana’s nuclear ambitions must be considered alongside the financial and operational condition of the wider electricity market.

Before entering construction, the country should demonstrate sustained progress in:

Nuclear power could eventually strengthen Ghana’s energy security, diversify generation and provide dependable electricity for industrial growth. It cannot, however, repair a structurally insolvent distribution system by itself.

Adding a capital-intensive nuclear plant to a market that struggles to recover the cost of existing generation could intensify rather than reduce fiscal pressure.

A financial-readiness assessment must therefore determine whether future electricity demand, tariffs, collections and industrial consumption can support a nuclear power purchase without requiring permanent government subsidies.

Ghana needs a Nuclear Project Preparation Facility

I propose the creation of a Ghana Nuclear Project Preparation Facility.

The facility should be a dedicated, ring-fenced mechanism for financing activities that must be completed before the main reactor procurement and construction loan.

Its mandate should cover:

The facility should have a multiyear budget. Geological, meteorological, hydrological and environmental studies cannot be conducted properly when funding is unpredictable or released in isolated annual allocations.

Its governance should include independent technical review, transparent procurement, audited accounts and clear rules governing donor and vendor participation.

Funding could come from a combination of:

No prospective reactor vendor should control the facility or determine its conclusions.

The purpose is to strengthen Ghana’s negotiating position and protect the national interest.

The regulator must not be the least-funded institution

A nuclear programme becomes dangerous when the project developer and reactor supplier possess vastly greater technical and financial resources than the national regulator.

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority will eventually need to assess and oversee:

The Authority will require experienced personnel, specialised software, laboratories, inspection systems, secure information infrastructure and access to independent technical-support organisations.

These capabilities cannot be assembled after the main construction contract has been signed.

Regulatory development should therefore be treated as part of Ghana’s nuclear capital programme. A protected multiyear budget should be established before the owner-operator submits major licensing applications.

Licence fees may eventually recover part of the cost. But the financing framework must not make the regulator dependent on the operator in a manner that compromises its independence.

The regulator’s duty is to the law, public safety and environmental protection—not to the commercial timetable of the project.

Nuclear Power Ghana must become a strong nuclear customer

Nuclear Power Ghana has responsibility for project development, feasibility, licensing, regulatory compliance, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and eventual decommissioning of the proposed plant. It has also engaged stakeholders on the possibility of becoming a statutory body.

Clarifying its long-term legal and institutional status is therefore important.

The owner-operator must have authority to:

At the same time, stronger statutory status must not remove financial discipline or public accountability.

Nuclear Power Ghana should be required to maintain:

It must become an informed nuclear customer capable of questioning vendors, managing interfaces and protecting Ghana’s interests—not merely an administrative vehicle through which a supplier delivers a plant.

Reactor size must follow grid and financial evidence

Ghana’s public nuclear planning has often referred to a plant of around 1,000 MWe, while the country has also explored small modular reactor cooperation.

The choice between a large reactor and an SMR should not be driven principally by vendor preference, diplomatic pressure or the appeal of a particular technology.

A large reactor could provide substantial firm power and support long-term industrialisation. But it would also represent a major single generating unit within Ghana’s electricity system. The grid would need adequate reserve capacity and transmission reinforcement to manage planned maintenance or an unplanned outage.

SMRs could permit more gradual capacity additions and reduce the capital required for each individual unit. However, early projects may carry first-of-a-kind costs, limited operating evidence, specialised fuel requirements and uncertain manufacturing schedules.

The appropriate choice should emerge from transparent assessment of:

Ghana should preserve flexibility until these issues have been resolved through independent analysis.

Regional exports should strengthen—not rescue—the business case

Ghana could eventually export some nuclear electricity through the West African Power Pool. Regional trade may improve plant utilisation and contribute to energy security across neighbouring states.

But expected exports should not be used as the principal justification for affordability unless supported by binding and creditworthy purchase arrangements.

Regional electricity transactions face transmission limitations, currency differences, payment risks and changing national demand.

A Ghanaian nuclear project should therefore remain economically defensible under realistic domestic-demand assumptions.

Cross-border sales should enhance the business case, not rescue a project that would otherwise be financially unsustainable.

Vendor financing must be examined as a strategic relationship

Ghana will probably require support from a reactor-supplier country, export-credit agency or strategic investor. Few nuclear-newcomer countries can finance a major reactor project entirely from domestic resources.

A supplier-backed package may include:

This can reduce immediate financing barriers, but it can also create long-term dependence on the supplier for fuel, maintenance, software, spare parts, technical expertise and future expansion.

Ghana should therefore evaluate the reactor and the financing package separately.

A bidder should be required to disclose:

An independent value-for-money and fiscal-risk assessment should be completed before approval of any final technology or financing arrangement.

The cheapest headline loan may contain expensive long-term guarantees. A higher initial price may sometimes provide greater cost certainty, stronger fuel arrangements or more credible technology transfer.

The relevant question is not simply which offer appears cheapest at signing. It is which arrangement provides the best national value and lowest acceptable risk across the project’s entire life.

A blended financing model may be Ghana’s most realistic option

In my assessment, Ghana is unlikely to finance its first nuclear plant through a single source.

A balanced structure could combine:

Government guarantees may be unavoidable, but they should be limited, quantified, disclosed and incorporated into the national fiscal-risk framework.

Construction-risk allocation will be especially important.

Ghana should avoid an arrangement under which all delays and cost increases are automatically transferred to the state or electricity consumer. Vendors and principal contractors must retain meaningful responsibility for design completion, construction quality and schedule performance.

SMRs may divide the financing challenge, but they do not remove it

SMRs are often promoted as more financeable because each unit should require less initial capital than a conventional large reactor.

This may allow Ghana to build capacity gradually and better match investment to demand growth.

But an SMR programme would still require:

Early SMRs may also depend on specialised fuels and supply chains that are not yet available at full commercial scale.

A smaller unit may reduce the size of each financing decision. It does not make nuclear infrastructure inexpensive or optional.

Ghana should compare large and small reactor options under the actual financing terms available to the country—not assumptions based on future factory production that has not yet been demonstrated.

Waste and decommissioning are obligations from the beginning

A responsible nuclear-financing model must cover the full lifecycle.

Ghana must determine:

Operators should contribute to ring-fenced waste and decommissioning funds during the plant’s operating life.

A project is not affordable merely because these costs have been excluded from the initial procurement proposal.

Postponing them simply transfers the burden to future taxpayers and generations.

The World Bank’s re-engagement creates an opportunity

In June 2025, the World Bank Group and the IAEA formalised a partnership to support the safe, secure and responsible use of nuclear energy in developing countries. The World Bank described the agreement as its first concrete re-engagement with nuclear power in decades and said its approach would emphasise informed national decision-making, affordability, reliability and alignment with IAEA standards.

This does not mean that the World Bank will finance every proposed reactor.

Its most immediate contribution may be in:

For Ghana and other African newcomers, this could help strengthen national decision-making before countries become commercially committed to a particular supplier.

The African Development Bank should reconsider its position

The African Development Bank’s published Energy Sector Policy states that financing nuclear plants is not an area of comparative advantage for the Bank and that it will not provide such financing.

In my view, that position deserves a transparent review.

A review would not require the Bank to begin immediately financing reactor construction. It would require Africa’s principal development-finance institution to build the capacity to assess nuclear programmes professionally and determine where support may be appropriate.

The Bank could potentially support:

African states should not depend exclusively on external supplier countries and non-African institutions to determine whether their nuclear programmes are credible.

The continent requires its own technical and financial capability.

Ghana should adopt a formal nuclear financial-readiness test

Before a final procurement decision, Ghana should complete a comprehensive and independently reviewed nuclear financial-readiness assessment.

At minimum, it should answer ten questions.

1. Is the project affordable under Ghana’s actual borrowing conditions?

The analysis must use realistic interest rates, loan tenors and currency assumptions.

2. Can the national grid integrate the proposed unit safely?

The study must consider transmission investment, reserve requirements and outage management.

3. Can the electricity purchaser meet long-term payment obligations?

The off-taker’s financial position must be assessed rather than assumed.

4. What sovereign guarantees will be required?

All contingent liabilities should be disclosed and included in debt and fiscal-risk analysis.

5. What happens if the cedi depreciates?

Foreign-currency debt, fuel and maintenance obligations must be tested against local-currency electricity revenues.

6. Can Ghana absorb construction delays or cost overruns?

Stress tests should examine several adverse scenarios.

7. Are the regulator and owner-operator adequately financed?

Institutional budgets must be developed alongside the reactor-financing package.

8. Is replacement fuel secure for the full operating life?

The assessment must address enrichment, fabrication, export approval, transport, price and alternative suppliers.

9. Are waste and decommissioning funds legally protected?

Future liabilities must have enforceable funding arrangements.

10. Do the national benefits justify the public exposure?

Employment, industrial development, energy security and technology transfer must be measurable and realistic.

Ghana should be willing to revise the reactor size, technology, ownership structure or timetable if this assessment identifies unacceptable fiscal or electricity-price risks.

That would not represent opposition to nuclear power. It would represent responsible programme governance.

What the US$6 trillion roadmap really means for Africa

The World Nuclear Association argues that the central global challenge is not simply a shortage of capital. It is the absence of the confidence, capability, standardisation and investment structures needed to allow capital to flow to nuclear projects at scale. The roadmap identifies institutional support, business standardisation, priceable risk, dependable revenue arrangements, supply-chain capacity and mechanisms for moving projects to financial maturity as essential conditions.

These conditions are even more important for African newcomer countries.

Investors will not provide affordable long-term capital merely because a president, minister or Parliament has declared nuclear power a national priority.

They will examine whether a country has:

Countries that establish these foundations will have a stronger chance of securing competitive finance.

Those that attempt to substitute political enthusiasm for institutional readiness will either pay more for capital or fail to reach construction.

Conclusion

The projected US$6 trillion global nuclear-investment requirement should awaken African policymakers to the true scale and complexity of nuclear finance.

For Ghana, this is not an abstract international figure. It is directly relevant to decisions that must now be taken on project preparation, site development, grid readiness, technology selection, institutional funding and the future structure of the electricity market.

Ghana has built a credible foundation. It has progressed into Phase Two, established a prospective owner-operator, developed an independent regulator and advanced the assessment of candidate sites.

The next challenge is to ensure that the programme becomes financially as credible as it is technically ambitious.

That requires financing more than concrete, steel and reactor equipment. It requires sustained investment in:

Ghana should not measure success by whether it announces a vendor or signs a reactor agreement before another country.

Success should be measured by whether the country secures a project that remains safe, affordable and financially sustainable after the political ceremonies have ended, construction difficulties have emerged and repayment has begun.

The purpose of Ghana’s nuclear programme must not simply be to add another generating plant. It should be to strengthen energy security, support industrial transformation and build national scientific and technological capability without undermining fiscal stability.

That balance is achievable but only if Ghana treats financial readiness as an essential nuclear-governance and national-development obligation, rather than as a commercial detail to be settled after procurement.

About the author

Raymond Agalga is a nuclear-policy analyst whose professional work focuses on nuclear governance, regulatory readiness, safeguards, nuclear security and the responsible development of nuclear-energy programmes in Africa.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the institutional position of NuclearAfrica.net or any organisation with which the author is affiliated.