Ghana Targets 1,000 MW of Nuclear Power by the Mid-2030s: What Must Happen Before Construction Can Begin?

Ghana has reaffirmed its ambition to introduce about 1,000 MW of nuclear generating capacity by the mid-2030s. Political commitment is strengthening and international partnerships are expanding, but the decisive phase now begins: converting a national nuclear ambition into a financeable, licensable and construction-ready project. NuclearAfrica examines the milestones Ghana still has to cross.

Ghana’s nuclear power programme is entering the period in which declarations of intent will increasingly be measured against implementation.

At the 2026 U.S.-Africa Nuclear Energy Summit in Accra, the government reaffirmed both its commitment to nuclear power and its ambition to introduce approximately 1,000 MW of nuclear capacity by the mid-2030s.

The target fits within Ghana’s wider plans to diversify electricity supply, provide dependable low-carbon power for industrialisation and reduce long-term exposure to fuel-price volatility. Ghana’s climate investment planning also identifies 1,000 MW of clean nuclear baseload generation as part of the country’s future energy transition.

The question now is no longer whether Ghana has a nuclear ambition. The question is what must happen between 2026 and the mid-2030s for that ambition to become an operating nuclear power plant.

The answer involves far more than selecting a reactor.

Ghana is in Phase Two, not yet in construction

Ghana is currently implementing Phase Two of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Milestones Approach for newcomer nuclear power programmes.

That distinction matters.

The IAEA framework identifies three broad phases and 19 infrastructure issues that countries should address in building a sustainable national nuclear power programme.

Phase One concerns the considerations necessary before making a knowledgeable commitment to nuclear power.

Phase Two involves developing the infrastructure required to prepare for contracting and construction.

Phase Three covers activities associated with contracting, licensing, construction and ultimately preparation for commissioning and operation.

The IAEA framework covers national policy, safety, management, funding and financing, the legal framework, safeguards, regulation, radiation protection, the electrical grid, human resources, stakeholder involvement, siting, environmental protection, emergency planning, nuclear security, the fuel cycle, radioactive waste, industrial involvement and procurement.

In other words, a nuclear project becomes construction-ready only when a network of technical, institutional, legal and financial systems is ready to support it.

Ghana has made substantial progress across several of those areas.

But important gaps remain.

1. Complete detailed site characterisation

One of the most immediate requirements is the detailed characterisation of the preferred nuclear site.

Selecting a location is not the same as proving that the site is suitable for a particular nuclear installation.

Nuclear site evaluation requires extensive data on geology, seismic conditions, hydrology, meteorology, flooding, coastal conditions where applicable, external hazards, population distribution, access, emergency planning and other site-specific factors.

These studies influence both reactor design and regulatory licensing.

In March 2026, Nuclear Power Ghana warned that funding for detailed site characterisation remained a major constraint.

Executive Director Stephen Yamoah said the programme could not move beyond Phase Two without completing the site work and related technical assessments.

This is therefore one of the clearest near-term tests of Ghana’s mid-2030s timeline.

A reactor technology cannot simply be placed on a map.

The selected technology and the selected site ultimately have to be demonstrated to be compatible.

2. Complete the environmental impact assessment

Closely connected with site characterisation is the environmental impact assessment.

A nuclear project must establish baseline environmental conditions before construction and assess potential impacts across the full project life cycle.

That may include marine and terrestrial ecosystems, water use, land use, thermal discharges, radioactive releases under normal operation, waste management, construction impacts, population issues and emergency considerations.

NPG identified the environmental assessment alongside site characterisation as one of the urgent activities facing a funding gap earlier this year.

This is not an administrative formality.

Environmental studies generate the data required by regulators, project developers, financiers and communities to understand the consequences of a proposed project.

The longer baseline-data collection is delayed, the greater the potential effect on the overall project schedule.

3. Close the nuclear regulatory gap

Perhaps the most consequential institutional requirement is completion of Ghana’s nuclear regulatory framework.

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority was established under Act 895 in 2015 and is responsible for regulating civilian nuclear and radiological activities.

However, important subsidiary regulations required to operationalise parts of the framework remain under development or approval.

At the end of Parliament’s Second Meeting on 31 July 2026, seven regulations under the Nuclear Regulatory Authority remained pending.

The NRA itself lists technical regulations addressing areas including licensing, nuclear security, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, emergency preparedness and radiation protection at various stages of development and approval.

For a country preparing to license its first nuclear power plant, this is significant.

The regulator needs a sufficiently complete framework to tell the owner-operator and technology supplier what requirements must be met.

A vendor can provide a reactor design. It cannot substitute for Ghanaian regulatory law.

The mid-2030s target therefore places pressure on the remaining regulatory instruments to move from draft documents into enforceable national requirements.

4. Build regulatory capacity alongside the regulations

Passing regulations alone will not solve the regulatory challenge.

Ghana must also ensure that the Nuclear Regulatory Authority has the personnel, financial resources, technical tools and organisational independence required to evaluate a commercial nuclear power project.

Nuclear licensing is highly specialised.

Regulators must be able to independently assess reactor safety, siting, construction quality, security, radiation protection, environmental interfaces, emergency arrangements and eventually commissioning and operation.

Where the domestic regulator does not initially possess every specialist capability, technical support organisations and international regulatory cooperation can provide support.

But external assistance does not remove the regulator’s national responsibility.

The regulator must be capable of understanding the analysis, challenging the applicant and making independent licensing decisions.

The workforce focus of USANES 2026 therefore has direct relevance to Ghana’s construction timetable.

Without a construction-ready regulator, there cannot be a credible construction-ready nuclear programme.

5. Complete the grid impact work

A 1,000 MW nuclear programme also raises important questions for Ghana’s electricity network.

Nuclear plants are not built independently of the grid into which they must deliver power.

The transmission system must be capable of receiving the plant’s output while maintaining grid stability under normal operation and during the unexpected loss of a large generating unit.

This is particularly important for relatively small electricity systems.

Ghana’s Ministry of Energy previously secured grant financing from the French Development Agency for a grid network study associated with the first nuclear power plant, while NPG said in March that a detailed grid impact study was expected to assess transmission capacity, required upgrades, substations and safety-related network requirements.

The outcome could influence technology selection itself.

A single large reactor places a different operational requirement on the grid than several smaller reactor modules added sequentially.

That makes grid analysis part of the technology decision, not something to be considered after the reactor is purchased.

6. Resolve the technology and procurement pathway

Ghana has explored both conventional large reactors and small modular reactor technologies.

That gives the country options, but it also creates a decision that cannot remain open indefinitely.

A large reactor of around 1,000 MW and a group of smaller reactors reaching a similar combined capacity can present very different profiles in terms of: capital requirements; construction sequencing; grid integration; localisation opportunities; fuel requirements; licensing; project risk; and financing.

Ghana’s procurement decision therefore needs to address more than reactor engineering.

It must determine which technology configuration best fits Ghana’s grid, industrial demand, financing capacity, regulatory maturity and long-term energy strategy.

Vendor selection also has geopolitical implications because nuclear relationships can last for several decades through fuel supply, technical services, maintenance and training.

The progressing Ghana-U.S. Section 123 Agreement expands the legal basis for deeper cooperation with American suppliers, but it does not in itself constitute a reactor procurement decision. Ghana confirmed during USANES that the agreement had been initialled and was awaiting remaining approvals.

Technology selection must ultimately remain a Ghanaian project decision based on transparent technical, economic, safety and financing criteria.

7. Decide how the plant will be financed

Financing may prove to be the most difficult issue of all. Nuclear power plants require very large upfront investment.

Even where lifetime generating costs appear attractive, financing construction can be challenging, particularly for emerging economies facing high interest rates, currency risks and competing public-investment priorities.

The cost of capital matters enormously because nuclear plants have large upfront capital requirements.

Ghana therefore needs more than a headline project cost. It needs a bankable financing structure.

Questions still requiring clear answers include:

Who owns the project?

How much equity is provided by the state?

Will a vendor government provide sovereign-backed financing?

Will export-credit agencies participate?

Can development-finance institutions contribute?

What guarantees will be required?

Who carries construction cost-overrun risk?

In what currency will debt be denominated?

How will foreign-exchange risk be managed?

What electricity tariff will support debt repayment?

And what happens if construction is delayed?

These are not questions for the end of the programme. They influence vendor choice, ownership structure and project viability from the beginning.

8. Fund the programme before trying to fund the reactor

There is also an important distinction between project-development financing and reactor-construction financing.

Ghana needs money now to complete Phase Two studies even before billions of dollars in construction finance become necessary.

That is why the funding gap identified for site characterisation and environmental studies deserves attention.

The Association of Ghana Industries repeated the concern during USANES 2026, arguing that financing constraints around site studies and environmental assessments could impede the transition towards construction readiness.

This may be one of the most underestimated risks to Ghana’s timetable.

A nuclear programme can be delayed long before construction because relatively smaller amounts needed for preparatory studies are not available when required.

For the mid-2030s target to remain credible, Phase Two funding needs to become predictable rather than episodic.

9. Develop the owner-operator into a construction-capable organisation

Nuclear Power Ghana will eventually carry responsibilities far beyond advocacy for nuclear power.

As the future owner-operator structure develops, it must build capability to participate in procurement, contract management, design review, project management, construction oversight, quality assurance, commissioning and eventual operations.

The IAEA places the owner-operator alongside government and the regulator as one of the three fundamental organisations in a newcomer nuclear programme.

During Phase Two, the owner-operator is expected to progressively develop the competencies required for later project activities.

This means institutional capacity cannot simply be imported from a vendor.

Ghana needs an intelligent customer capable of understanding what it is buying, managing contracts and protecting national interests throughout the project life cycle.

That capacity takes years to build.

10. Build the workforce before construction creates demand

USANES 2026 focused precisely on this challenge.

Ghana will require engineers and reactor operators, but also nuclear-qualified welders, electricians, quality-assurance personnel, technicians, project managers, cybersecurity specialists, radiation-protection personnel, emergency planners and regulatory inspectors.

The government used the summit to highlight Ghana’s participation in U.S.-supported workforce initiatives and its effort to position the country as a regional SMR training hub.

GAEC similarly called for investment in scientists, engineers, technicians, operators and regulators and for greater sharing of training facilities across African countries.

The critical issue is timing.

It is inefficient to train large numbers of highly specialised personnel too early if there is no project for them to work on.

It is equally dangerous to wait until construction begins before developing the workforce.

Ghana therefore needs a workforce plan aligned with the actual project schedule, identifying how many people are required, with what skills, and at what stage.

11. Prepare Ghanaian industry for nuclear standards

If Ghana wants the nuclear programme to contribute meaningfully to industrialisation, domestic companies must be prepared to participate.

That requires more than adopting a local-content target.

Nuclear suppliers work within demanding systems of quality assurance, traceability, documentation, materials control and safety classification.

Companies that currently supply Ghana’s construction, mining, oil and gas or power sectors may possess relevant capabilities, but nuclear qualification can require additional systems and certification.

A national nuclear supply-chain assessment should therefore identify what Ghanaian industry can provide immediately, what could be provided after targeted upgrading and what will need to be imported for the first plant.

AGI’s intervention at USANES was important precisely because it connected the nuclear programme with Ghana’s wider industrial future.

The industrial strategy and reactor strategy should develop together.

12. Develop credible arrangements for fuel and radioactive waste

Nuclear project planning must also address the beginning and end of the fuel cycle.

Ghana will need a strategy for procuring nuclear fuel and ensuring long-term security of supply.

Depending on the technology chosen, fuel requirements could have implications for supplier dependence, enrichment services and international safeguards arrangements.

At the other end of the cycle, Ghana must plan for radioactive waste and spent fuel.

A first reactor does not require a final geological disposal facility to be operational on the first day of generation, but national policy, responsibilities, financing arrangements and interim storage strategies cannot be ignored.

These are among the 19 infrastructure issues addressed under the IAEA Milestones framework.

The reactor technology decision should therefore consider the complete fuel-cycle implications, not merely construction cost and output.

13. Strengthen nuclear security and emergency preparedness

Any commercial nuclear programme also requires a mature nuclear security regime.

The country must establish arrangements for physical protection, cybersecurity, access control, insider-threat mitigation, material accounting and coordination between the operator, regulator, police, intelligence, emergency services and other national institutions.

Emergency preparedness must similarly extend beyond the plant fence.

Roles, responsibilities, communications, exercises, public-information systems and emergency zones must be developed and tested.

These arrangements become increasingly important as the programme moves closer to construction and operation.

Nuclear security and emergency preparedness are therefore not post-construction activities.

They are part of construction readiness.

14. Build public trust around the real project

Ghana’s nuclear programme will eventually move from an abstract national debate to decisions affecting specific communities.

That transition changes the nature of stakeholder engagement.

People will want to know:

Where will the plant be built?

Why was the site selected?

What technology will be used?

What will it cost?

Who owns it?

How will safety be assured?

What emergency arrangements will exist?

What happens to radioactive waste?

What opportunities will local communities receive?

And who bears responsibility if something goes wrong?

Energy Minister John Abdulai Jinapor acknowledged during the summit that nuclear energy still creates anxiety among parts of Ghanaian society and called for stronger communication and stakeholder engagement.

Public confidence cannot be built through promotional messaging alone.

It requires access to credible information, transparent decision-making and visible regulatory independence.

15. Turn the mid-2030s target into a public implementation schedule

Perhaps the most important next step would be to translate Ghana’s 1,000 MW ambition into a clearly sequenced roadmap.

A credible implementation schedule should identify expected windows for:

completion of site studies;

environmental assessment;

regulatory instruments;

grid studies;

technology selection;

financing decisions;

project contracting;

construction licensing;

first concrete;

construction milestones;

fuel procurement;

commissioning;

and commercial operation.

The programme does not need to promise artificial precision years in advance.

But public milestones would make it possible to distinguish genuine progress from repeated political announcements.

They would also improve accountability across institutions.

From ambition to execution

Ghana has advantages.

It has decades of nuclear experience through the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission.

It operates a research reactor.

It has an established nuclear regulator.

It has Nuclear Power Ghana as the programme’s owner-operator organisation.

It has sustained engagement with the IAEA.

It has expanding partnerships with nuclear supplier countries.

It is developing workforce and simulation capabilities.

And political commitment to nuclear power has survived changes of government.

Those are significant assets.

But commercial nuclear construction represents a different level of complexity.

The next phase of Ghana’s programme will be determined less by declarations of support and more by the ability to coordinate site work, legislation, regulation, financing, grid infrastructure, procurement, workforce development and industrial participation within one coherent programme.

The mid-2030s target is still possible as a strategic objective.

But every delay in Phase Two compresses the construction window that follows.

Why This Matters for Africa

Ghana is increasingly becoming an important test case for African nuclear newcomer countries.

Unlike Egypt, where four large reactors are already under construction at El Dabaa, Ghana is still building the infrastructure necessary for its first commercial nuclear project.

Its experience therefore has particular relevance for countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and other African states moving through earlier stages of nuclear consideration.

The lesson is that nuclear deployment is not primarily a reactor-purchasing exercise.

It is a national infrastructure-building exercise.

A country can select a vendor quickly.

Developing a competent regulator, bankable financing structure, qualified workforce, suitable site, stable grid, trusted institutions and durable supply chain takes much longer.

Ghana’s 1,000 MW target should therefore be judged not simply by whether a reactor eventually appears on the coast.

The real measure of success will be whether Ghana builds the institutions necessary to operate that reactor safely, securely, economically and independently for generations.

The next several years will determine whether the mid-2030s remains a realistic destination or becomes another target that has to be moved.

NuclearAfrica Implementation Watch

Current ambition: Approximately 1,000 MW of nuclear capacity by the mid-2030s.

Current programme stage: Phase Two of the IAEA Milestones Approach.

Critical near-term issues: Site characterisation, environmental assessment, nuclear regulations, grid studies, financing, technology and procurement decisions.

Institutional priorities: Regulatory capacity, owner-operator development, workforce planning and nuclear-qualified local supply chain.