A new US Government Accountability Office report warns that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is struggling to recruit and retain enough specialised staff as advanced-reactor licensing activity grows. For African countries preparing their first nuclear power programmes, the message is straightforward: regulatory competence cannot be created after reactor applications begin arriving.
By NuclearAfrica Editorial Desk
5 October 2026
The United States possesses one of the most mature nuclear regulatory systems in the world. Its Nuclear Regulatory Commission has decades of experience overseeing commercial reactors, spent fuel, radioactive materials and new reactor licensing. The country also has major universities, national laboratories, experienced utilities and one of the deepest nuclear workforces globally.
Yet even this mature system is confronting a fundamental problem: having enough qualified people to regulate the next phase of nuclear development.
A new report from the US Government Accountability Office, published on 28 September 2026, says the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has faced longstanding difficulties recruiting and retaining adequate staff and that increased attrition and competition from the nuclear industry have made those difficulties more pronounced in recent years. This comes as the NRC anticipates a substantial increase in applications for advanced nuclear reactors.
For African nuclear newcomers, this should be treated as more than an American workforce story. It exposes one of the least visible but most important constraints on nuclear deployment. A country may establish a regulator in law, create an owner-operator, sign cooperation agreements and even select a reactor technology. None of those steps guarantees that the regulator will have enough experienced engineers, safety analysts, inspectors, security specialists, safeguards professionals, lawyers and technical experts to independently assess what is eventually submitted for licensing.
A regulator exists on paper because legislation creates it. A credible regulator exists in practice because it has the competence, resources and institutional confidence to question applicants, challenge vendors and refuse approval when requirements are not satisfied.
A mature regulator facing a serious staffing problem
The scale of the NRC’s workforce challenge is striking. GAO found that between July 2024 and June 2026, the Commission lost about 500 employees on a net basis, with voluntary retirements accounting for most of the decline. NRC officials and most of the external stakeholders interviewed by GAO said increasing attrition and competition with the nuclear industry were affecting the stability of the workforce.
This is occurring at exactly the time when the United States is attempting to expand nuclear deployment and modernise reactor licensing. The ADVANCE Act of 2024 introduced measures intended to make licensing more efficient and predictable while also giving the NRC additional flexibility to recruit and retain specialist personnel. The law provides, among other things, new direct-hiring authority, compensation flexibility and bonuses intended to help the agency respond to growing workforce pressures.
But legislation cannot manufacture expertise overnight.
GAO found that, between July 2024 and July 2026, the NRC had used its new authority to award US$335,000 in performance bonuses to 18 existing employees, but had not yet used the direct-hire or compensation-flexibility authorities. The agency has been developing a strategic workforce-planning tool, known as NEXUS, to identify critical staffing needs, but completion has been delayed. GAO recommended that the NRC finalise the tool and establish metrics to determine whether the new authorities are actually improving recruitment and retention.
The wider significance is clear. Even where government gives a regulator more authority to hire and pay specialists, it still takes time to identify the competencies required, recruit the right people and build institutional experience.
For newcomer countries, that challenge begins from a much smaller base.
Regulatory independence is also a question of competence
Discussions of nuclear regulatory independence often focus on law and institutional structure. Is the regulator legally separate from the organisation promoting nuclear power? Can ministers interfere with licensing decisions? Does the regulatory body have the authority to inspect facilities, issue licences, impose conditions and take enforcement action?
Those questions are fundamental, but independence also has a technical dimension.
A regulator can be legally independent and still become functionally dependent if it lacks sufficient expertise of its own. If the regulator does not possess enough internal competence, it may depend excessively on the reactor vendor to explain the safety case, on the owner-operator to interpret technical documents, or on foreign consultants to tell it whether a design is acceptable.
International technical support is normal and useful. No serious nuclear regulator operates in complete isolation. But outside advice must strengthen national decision-making rather than replace it.
The final judgement on whether a reactor is safe to site, construct, commission and operate remains the responsibility of the national regulator. That institution must therefore understand the technical advice it receives well enough to question assumptions, demand additional evidence and reach its own conclusion.
This is why workforce development is not merely an employment matter. It is part of regulatory independence itself.
Nuclear regulation demands far more than general engineering competence
The technical scope of commercial reactor regulation is broad.
A regulator reviewing a nuclear power plant may need expertise in reactor physics, thermal hydraulics, structural engineering, civil works, materials science, electrical systems, instrumentation and control, seismic hazards, external events, probabilistic safety assessment, severe accidents, human factors and radiation protection.
It must also address emergency preparedness, radioactive waste, nuclear security, cybersecurity, safeguards interfaces, environmental protection, quality assurance, ageing management and eventually decommissioning.
The workload changes again when construction begins. Inspectors must verify that structures, systems and components are being built in accordance with approved designs and nuclear-quality requirements. Welding, concrete placement, equipment qualification, material traceability, nondestructive testing, supplier quality, configuration management and corrective actions all become matters of regulatory concern.
Once the plant starts operating, the regulator moves into another long period of responsibility involving maintenance, modifications, outages, operating events, radiation protection, security, emergency exercises and licence renewal.
Regulatory workforce planning must therefore look decades ahead.
A country does not simply need enough people to issue the first construction licence. It needs an institution capable of remaining technically competent throughout the entire life of the facility.
The IAEA expects workforce development to begin early
The IAEA’s guidance for countries embarking on nuclear power is explicit that human-resource planning must begin well before plant operation and, in some areas, even before a particular reactor design has been selected.
Its guidance on human resource management for newcomer programmes identifies workforce planning, recruitment, education, training, development, remuneration and retention as central issues throughout the three phases of the Milestones Approach. It also notes that countries may need to establish new educational programmes, create training facilities, recruit internationally, send personnel abroad for training and secondment, and make some of these investments before selecting a specific reactor technology.
The logic is straightforward. By the time a country is preparing to invite bids for its first nuclear power plant, it already needs qualified people capable of preparing technical specifications, evaluating technologies and understanding the safety and regulatory implications of different designs.
The IAEA’s Milestones guidance specifically states that, by this stage, well-qualified regulatory personnel should already be developing the regulations, codes and standards under which the plant will be licensed. It also identifies the need for expertise in site qualification, radiation protection, safeguards, physical protection, emergency planning, radioactive waste management and eventual operational oversight.
This means that regulatory workforce development cannot sensibly begin after a reactor vendor has been selected.
If a regulator starts recruiting serious reactor-licensing expertise only when the construction application arrives, it has already lost valuable time.
African newcomers will face an even sharper competition for specialists
The American experience also highlights another problem that is likely to be particularly difficult in Africa: the regulator and the nuclear industry often want to hire the same people.
An experienced reactor engineer can work for the regulator, the owner-operator, a reactor vendor, an engineering consultancy, a technical-support organisation, a university or an international institution.
The private sector may be able to pay considerably more.
This becomes a major issue in countries with relatively small nuclear labour markets. A country may graduate or train a limited number of specialists, only to discover that the regulator, owner-operator, universities and private contractors are all competing for the same individuals.
The problem becomes even more difficult when highly qualified professionals can move internationally.
A workforce strategy that simply counts how many people have been trained may therefore create a false sense of readiness. The more important questions are how many people remain available, where they are employed, whether their skills match programme needs and whether institutions can retain them long enough to build experience.
For newcomer countries, retention should be treated as seriously as recruitment.
Public-sector pay structures may become a safety issue
This creates an uncomfortable but necessary policy discussion.
Many African regulators operate within public-sector remuneration systems. Those systems may be appropriate for conventional administrative institutions but may not reflect the labour market for highly specialised nuclear professionals.
If a regulator invests for years in developing an experienced safety analyst or inspector and that individual can earn substantially more by joining the owner-operator or reactor vendor, the regulator may continuously lose some of its strongest personnel precisely when programme demands are increasing.
No public regulator can or should attempt to outbid every commercial employer. But governments must recognise that remuneration, professional progression, international training, technical responsibility and institutional prestige all influence retention.
A nuclear regulator cannot be expected to sustain specialist competence indefinitely if employment conditions make regulatory service unattractive.
The US GAO findings show that this problem does not disappear merely because a country already has a mature nuclear sector.
For African newcomers, the issue deserves attention before major recruitment begins.
Training courses are necessary, but they do not create regulators by themselves
There is a tendency in nuclear capacity-building programmes to measure progress by the number of workshops attended, courses completed or certificates awarded.
These activities are useful, but they are not equivalent to regulatory competence.
A participant who attends a short course on reactor safety does not immediately become capable of independently reviewing a complex safety analysis report. That level of competence develops through formal education, mentoring, repeated application, practical assignments, supervised technical work and exposure to real licensing and inspection decisions.
For this reason, secondments to experienced regulators and technical-support organisations can be particularly valuable. A regulator who spends months participating in real design reviews, inspections or licensing assessments may return with deeper practical capability than one who attends repeated short training courses without applying the knowledge.
Capacity-building programmes should therefore increasingly ask whether the training produces demonstrated competence.
The objective is not to accumulate certificates.
It is to build the judgement required to make difficult regulatory decisions.
Technical-support organisations could become a major part of the African solution
No regulator can employ every specialist it may ever need.
Even mature nuclear countries rely on external technical and scientific support for highly specialised assessments.
This creates an important opportunity for Africa.
Instead of every nuclear-newcomer country attempting to build a large permanent staff covering every specialist discipline, national regulators could develop strong internal core competence while drawing on independent technical-support organisations for highly specialised work.
The key word is independent.
A technical organisation financed or controlled by the applicant or reactor vendor cannot substitute for independent regulatory analysis.
Regional arrangements may therefore deserve greater attention. Africa may not initially require a separate full-scale technical-support institution in every newcomer state. Some expertise could potentially be pooled or made available regionally, particularly in fields that may not require continuous full-time staffing during every stage of every programme.
This could include specialist competence in severe-accident analysis, probabilistic safety assessment, reactor materials, digital systems, radioactive waste or particular areas of security and safeguards.
Such an approach would not remove national responsibility. It would give regulators access to stronger independent technical resources while avoiding unnecessary duplication.
FNRBA already provides a platform that could be strengthened
The Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, established in 2009, already provides a regional structure for regulatory cooperation. Its purpose includes strengthening and harmonising nuclear and radiation safety and security infrastructure and providing a platform for the exchange of experience among African regulatory authorities.
The Forum brings together regulators from across the continent and maintains technical working groups dealing with areas such as education and knowledge management, legislative and regulatory infrastructure, research-reactor safety, licensing of nuclear power plants, radioactive waste, transport, emergency planning and nuclear security.
This makes FNRBA a potentially important vehicle for the next stage of African nuclear development.
As more countries advance commercial nuclear programmes, the Forum could increasingly support workforce mapping, specialist rosters, joint regulatory training, shared technical-support mechanisms and peer exchanges focused specifically on reactor licensing.
Its own material has recognised the challenge of limited mechanisms for identifying and sharing technical expertise across the region.
The answer should not be to dilute national responsibility. It should be to give national regulators access to a stronger continental knowledge network.
Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda should learn from the US warning now
The lesson is particularly relevant to African countries moving deeper into nuclear programme development.
For Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and others, the regulatory workload will increase substantially as programmes move from general infrastructure development into site evaluation, technology-specific assessment and reactor licensing.
At that stage, workforce planning must become much more detailed.
A regulator does not simply need “more engineers.” It needs to know which competencies are required at each stage, how many specialists are necessary, how long training will take, which expertise can be developed domestically and which areas will require international technical support.
A headcount is not a competency plan.
Twenty generalist engineers cannot necessarily substitute for several specialists with the particular expertise required to challenge a reactor safety case.
The strongest approach would therefore be for each regulator to maintain a detailed competency map aligned with the expected licensing schedule.
Such a map should show where expertise already exists, where existing staff can be developed, where recruitment is necessary and where independent external support will be required.
This should be treated as a living programme-management tool rather than a one-off human-resources document.
Succession planning matters as much as recruitment
The GAO report also provides another important warning: much of the NRC’s recent net workforce loss came from voluntary retirements.
This is especially significant in nuclear regulation because experience is difficult to replace quickly.
A senior inspector or analyst may carry knowledge accumulated over decades of licensing decisions, plant inspections, enforcement cases and operating events. When that person leaves, the institution loses more than a position on an organisational chart.
It can lose institutional memory.
African regulators should therefore build succession planning into their systems from the beginning.
Younger staff should work alongside experienced professionals. Important technical decisions should be documented systematically. Lessons from inspections should be captured. Regulatory positions and their technical basis should be preserved so that knowledge remains within the institution rather than leaving with individual employees.
Knowledge management may appear less urgent than reactor design review, but over the life of a nuclear programme it becomes part of the regulator’s safety capability.
Governments must finance the regulator as part of the nuclear programme
There is also a financial lesson.
Nuclear programme budgets often concentrate attention on site studies, feasibility work, owner-operator development, vendor negotiations and eventual construction.
The regulator risks being treated as an administrative cost on the side.
That is a mistake.
A regulator needs resources long before construction begins. It needs enough staff, training budgets, inspection equipment, secure information systems, legal support, laboratories where appropriate and access to independent technical assistance.
These costs should therefore appear explicitly in national nuclear programme planning.
A country that can find billions of dollars to construct a reactor but cannot fund the institution responsible for independently reviewing and overseeing that reactor does not yet have a financially credible nuclear programme.
Regulatory capability is not an optional overhead.
It is part of the safety infrastructure.
Efficiency must not become pressure to approve
The US debate also raises a broader issue that African newcomers will eventually face.
Governments understandably want licensing processes that are efficient and predictable. Investors need clarity. Reactor vendors do not want unnecessary administrative delay. Utilities need realistic schedules.
The ADVANCE Act itself seeks more efficient, timely and predictable regulation while preserving the NRC’s safety and security mission.
That balance is important.
Regulatory efficiency is desirable when it removes duplication, improves procedures and focuses reviews on genuine safety significance.
But efficiency should never become political pressure to approve.
African regulators may eventually face demands to meet construction schedules, financing milestones or political target dates. Those pressures can become especially intense after governments have already announced vendors or signed major agreements.
A regulator must be protected from the idea that taking more time necessarily represents institutional failure.
A licensing delay may be politically inconvenient.
An inadequately reviewed design can create consequences lasting for decades.
The warning for Africa is bigger than the US report itself
The GAO report does not say that the NRC is unable to regulate the American nuclear sector. Its concern is that workforce pressures may affect the agency’s ability to meet future mission demands unless planning, recruitment and retention improve.
That distinction should be maintained.
But the lesson for Africa remains powerful.
If a regulator with decades of experience, a large specialist workforce and access to one of the world’s deepest nuclear knowledge bases must actively rethink how it recruits and retains expertise, newcomer countries should assume that their own challenge will be substantial.
They should plan accordingly.
Conclusion
Nuclear programmes are often judged by visible milestones.
A preferred site is announced. A vendor is shortlisted. A financing agreement is signed. First concrete is poured. Major components arrive. Fuel is eventually loaded.
Yet one of the most important indicators of readiness is far less visible: whether the regulator has enough qualified people to understand what is being proposed and enough institutional confidence to challenge it.
The American experience shows that regulatory workforce capacity cannot be taken for granted, even in a mature nuclear country.
African newcomers should learn from that before their own licensing workloads become overwhelming.
They need long-term strategies for recruitment, retention, succession, technical support and knowledge management. Regional cooperation through organisations such as FNRBA should be strengthened, and serious consideration should be given to shared independent technical-support capability where that can improve regulatory quality.
Most importantly, governments must stop treating the regulator as an administrative institution attached to the nuclear programme.
It is part of the programme’s core safety infrastructure.
A country may import reactor technology, fuel, construction expertise and even specialist advice.
But it cannot outsource the sovereign responsibility for determining whether a nuclear facility is safe enough to build and operate.
That responsibility ultimately depends on people.
Those people must be developed long before the first major licence application arrives.





